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Quantum random number generators (QRNG) represent an advanced solution for randomness
generation, essential in every cryptographic applications. In this context, integrated arrays of single
photon detectors have promising applications as QRNGs based on the spatial detection of photons.
For the employment of QRNGs in Cryptography, it is necessary to have efficient methods to evaluate
the so called quantum min-entropy that corresponds to the amount of the true extractable quantum
randomness from the QRNG. Here we present an efficient method that allow to estimate the quantum
min-entropy for a multi-detector QRNG. In particular, we will consider a scenario in which an
attacker can control the efficiency of the detectors and knows the emitted number of photons.
Eventually, we apply the method to a QRNG with 103 detectors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Randomness is the fundamental ingredient of any cryp-
tographic protocol. Classical, quantum and even post-
quantum algorithms are indeed based on the availability
of genuine and secret random numbers. Cryptographic
random number generators are required to meet two main
requisites: the first is to generate unbiased and uncor-
related random numbers; the second requirement is to
provide no information about its output to the “environ-
ment”. In this respect, random number generators based
on quantum physical processes (QRNG) are considered
more secure than chaos-based RNGs and algorithmic-
RNGs: indeed, for QRNGs, unpredictability comes from
the intrinsic probabilistic nature of a measurement in
Quantum Mechanics. However, realistic implementations
of QRNGs must take into account “imperfections” of
the physical devices used in the generator. The latters
might introduce statistical flaws, e.g. bias and correla-
tions in the generated numbers and, more importantly,
might provide side information to an attacker. Hence, it
is of paramount importance to estimate the leakage of in-
formation of the QRNG (also called side information) in
order to discard the bits which might have been guessed
by an eavesdropper.
The purpose of this work is the evaluation of such side
information and the extraction of random numbers for
a QRNG based on an integrated array of single photon
detectors. In the framework of discrete variable QRNG,
this scheme is promising because it is equivalent to “par-
allelize” multiple generators [1] and indeed it has been ex-
plored in recent works [2–5]. However, an advanced secu-
rity model for the estimation of the maximal extractable
randomness, was still missing. In this work we provide
it, by generalizing a novel paradigm recently introduced
in [6] for the side information of a two-detector QRNG.
We will present a computationally efficient method to
estimate the quantum min-entropy for systems with a
generic number of detectors. We finally experimentally
applied our method to a single photon camera that we
converted into a QRNG.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section II A we
describe how raw random numbers can be generated with
the single photon camera system. In Section II B we
introduce the enhanced security model for the QRNG,
which is based on the estimation of its min-entropy con-
ditioned on the accessible side information. In Section
III, we show how the entropy can be efficiently evalu-
ated by a combinatorial approach. In Section IV the
new paradigm is applied to the QRNG and the results
are discussed.
II. METHODS
A. Raw randomness generation
Our generator is based on the detection of photons by
an array of single photon detectors. The system consists
of a light source which uniformly illuminates the Single
Photon Counting Camera SPC2 manufactured by Micro
Photon Devices [7, 8] and originally intended for the ac-
quisition of images at low level of illumination. Random
numbers are generated according to which detector has
clicked during a given time interval, as detailed below.
The Camera is based on M = 1024 single photon de-
tectors arranged in a matrix of 32 × 32 pixels. Every
pixel is equipped with a single photon avalanche detector
(SPAD) and its quenching circuit. Contrarily to normal
CMOS or CCD sensors, where many photoelectrons are
accumulated and converted in a digital value, here every
single detected photon increases a counter associated to
every pixel.
Raw random numbers are generated by using the setup
schematically reported in Fig.1-A. A laser (λ = 808 nm)
coupled with a SM-optical fiber, is arranged in front of
the camera to provide a controlled photon flux on the
sensor. The laser intensity is not stricktly uniform on
the array as it features the typical Gaussian profile of
a TEM00 mode. However, according to the distance d
between the fiber output and the sensor, the laser in-
tensity can be considered “locally” uniform on M ′ < M
pixels (where M ′ increases as function of d; the data con-
sidered here were collected for d = 10 cm). The SPC2
ar
X
iv
:1
60
5.
04
80
8v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
16
 M
ay
 20
16
2No photon
arrived
Lost 
detection
Succesful
detection
FIG. 1. Box A: Illustration of the SPC2 camera illuminated by the 808 nm light coming from a single mode fiber. Box B: the
temporal structure of an acquisition is illustrated. Box C: The process of random number generation is reported for a single
frame.
detects the light by acquiring multiple “frames” as we
illustrate in Fig.1-B. Every frame is characterized by an
integration interval T , that we set to T = 200 ns (the
shortest integration interval achievable by the camera).
Frames are obtained at a rate of Racq = 49 kHz, corre-
sponding to a temporal distance between two frames of
∆t = 1/Racq. The counter of each pixel detector Di in
each frame can take only two values, xi = 0 and xi = 1,
corresponding to a non-detection and a photon-detection
respectively. Hence, for each frame, a random number
x = {x1, . . . , xM} is generated by concatenating the pixel
outputs in a string M bits long. We indicate by X the
random variable that takes the x values. To illustrate the
process, in Fig.1-C, we show a sub-matrix of 3×3 pixels.
In the figure the sub-matrix is characterized by n = 9 in-
coming photons from the laser which are independently
acquired by the pixel detectors. Due to inefficiencies of
the detectors or dead-time, some of the incoming photon
are not registered by the pixel detectors.
The probabilities to obtain xi = 0 or xi = 1 from a
pixel Di are respectively denoted by P(i)0 and P(i)1 . Such
probabilities depend on the mean photon number µi at
detector Di and from the detector features. By properly
adjusting the µi is then possible to obtain an “unbiased”
sequence, i.e. P(i)0 = P(i)1 = 1/2. In order to simplify the
evaluation of the probability P(x) of generating a string
x, it can be assumed that on a small sub-matrix the light
intensity is uniform, i.e. µi ≈ µ. For the case considered
in the scheme, we are considering the pixel square cor-
responding to the centre of the matrix. Furthermore, as
the SPADs are approximately characterized by the same
efficiency, it can be also assumed that ηi ≈ η. With
these assumptions, as the pixels detect the photons in-
dependently, we have that P(i)0 ≡ P0 and P(i)1 ≡ P1, ∀i.
Then, the probability P(x) of generating a string x with
k bits 1 and M − k bits 0 is given by P(x) = PM−k0 Pk1 .
If we assume that the QRNG is a perfectly isolated
system, the number of random bits that can be obtained
in each frame by the generator is measured by the so
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FIG. 2. (left) Min-entropy H∞(X): experimental data (black
dots) and fit (solid red line) are reported as a function of the
mean photon number µ per pixel for M = 9 pixels. (right)
The M + 1 inequivalent P(x) = PM−k0 Pk1 are reported for
k ∈ [0, 9]: the x corresponding to smaller k are more likely
with respect to the ones corresponding to larger k. Indeed,
the top curve corresponds to k = 0 while the bottom one to
k = 9.
called classical min-entropy
H∞(X) = − log2[max
x
P(x)] . (1)
When P(x) = PM−k0 Pk1 , the classical min-entropy can
be easily evaluated as H∞(X) = −M log2[max{P0,P1}].
The unbiased randomness rate thus becomes Rgen =
H∞(X)Racq. In Fig.2 (left) we report H∞(X) as a
function of µ with the relative experimental data. In
Fig.2 (right), the ten inequivalent probabilities P(x),
for k ∈ [0, 9] are plotted: for the values of µ (from 0
to 15 photons/pixel) considered in the experiment, the
most likely outcome is the string with all bits equal to
zero. The accordance of the experimental points with
the theoretical prediction shows that the approximations
µi ≈ µ and ηi ≈ η are well justified. To achieve the
maximal rate, a proper value of µ = µopt should be
used, which enables an uniform distribution of the out-
comes x. For the case considered in Fig.2, such value
is µopt ≈ 28 photons per pixels. For this optimal value
it is possible to achieve the maximum generation rate
of Rgen = MRacq = 50.176 Mbit/s corresponding to a
min-entropy H∞(X) = M . However, when the QRNG
is used in a cryptographic scenario, the content of true
random bits must be evaluated in a different way and the
maximum generation rate is achieved with lower values
3of µ, as demonstrated below.
B. Secure randomness generation
For cryptographic applications, the classical min-
entropy H∞(X) cannot be used and more advanced
measures of randomness are needed: indeed, beside the
requirement of being independent and identically dis-
tributed, it is also necessary that the numbers are not
known to anyone else but the legitimate user. In this
case, it is necessary to evaluate the so called conditional
quantum min-entropy Hmin(X|E) [9–11]. The obtained
random sequence will be post-processed with a seeded
randomness extractor, obtaining a random stream whose
lenght is determined by Hmin(X|E).
The quantum min-entropy is related to the correlations
that the quantum system has with the environment E
that can be controlled by an adversary. These possible
correlations follow from non-idealities of the QRNG de-
vices: for instance the input state may be mixed and
the performed measurements may correspond to posi-
tive operator value measurements (POVM) rather than
projectors. For ideal QRNGs, where the random num-
bers are generated by measuring an isolated system with
devices implementing perfect projector operators, the
Hmin(X|E) reduces to the classical min-entropy. How-
ever, for realistic QRNGs, Hmin(X|E) cannot be exactly
known and a typical approach consists in finding a lower
bound. For instance, by assuming trusted measurement
devices and a completely untrusted source, a lower bound
on Hmin(X|E) can be found [12, 13].
In [6], Frauchiger et al. addressed this problem for
the “welcher weg” QRNG, implemented by a diagonally
polarized photon impinging on a polarizing beam splitter
(PBS): depending on its polarization (horizontal H or
vertical V ), the photon is transmitted or reflected by the
PBS. There, the photonic state is assumed to be pure but
the measurements on the PBS output spatial modes are
described by POVMs. In this framework, the residual
randomness is measured by means of Hmin(X|C). The
classical random variable C encodes classical information
about the degrees of freedom associated to the hardware
non-idealities. In particular, C describes the state of the
generator with respect to the multi-photon emission from
the light source, (i.e. the number of emitted photons) and
the detectors inefficiencies. The significant advantage of
this paradigm is that C is accessible and measurable by
the QRNG user. Furthermore, the authors demonstrate
that Hmin(X|E) ≥ Hmin(X|C), i.e. by conditioning on
the classical information the QRNG is at least as secure
as by conditioning on E. In the following we will show
that such model can be adapted to the camera QRNG.
The model that we are considering for the multi-pixel
QRNG is thus the following:
• the eavesdropper has information on the photon
number emission of the source;
• the eavesdropper may determine the activation of
single pixels during each acquisition;
We now explain in detail the above mentioned model.
The multi-photon emission is characterized by the proba-
bility distribution PN (n) of the classical random variable
N ∈ N, which depends on the source itself (for a laser
source PN (n) = e−µµn/n!). Eve is supposed to know
the number of photons n emitted in each pulse. More-
over, detectors inefficiencies and dead times can be mod-
elled by perfect detectors that are activated, with a given
probability η˜i, by the eavesdropper. In such scenario, the
eavesdropper has the ability to deactivate any pixels Di
in order to “set” to 0 the bits xi. The probabilities {η˜i}
must match the measured probabilities P(i)0 and P(i)1 of
obtaining 0 or 1 at pixel i, namely
P(i)0 = 1− η˜i(1− P(i)0 ) , P(i)1 = η˜i(1− P(i)0 ) . (2)
In the above equations, P(i)0 is the probability that no
photon arrives at the pixel detector i. The probabilities
η˜i can be regarded as an “equivalent efficiency” which
accounts for the effects of both the quantum efficiency of
the SPAD, ηi, and its dead time. Depending on µ, the
probability P(i)0 will change and Eve adjusts η˜i in order to
satisfy Eq. (2). This can be understood by considering
Fig.4, where the value of η˜ is reported as function of µ.
We associate a random variable si to the status of a pixel
Di, such that si = 0 labels the inactive status, while si =
1 corresponds to the active status. In each frame, Eve
selects a pixel configuration vector s = {s1, s2, . . . , sM}
with probability PS(s) =
∏M
i=1 η˜
si
i (1 − η˜i)1−si from the
set S = {s} of cardinality 2M .
Within this framework, the accessible classical infor-
mation is therefore identified by C = {N,S}. We will
demonstrate that, even if the eavesdropper has this in-
formation at hand, secure random numbers may be gen-
erated. In our model, additional hardware defects, such
as after-pulses (intended as the enhanced probability of
having a detection at frame j + 1 if the pixel clicked at
frame j) and cross-talks among the pixels, are not in-
cluded. Indeed their effect can be neglected since we
measured a negligible after-pulse probability and a prob-
ability pct ≈ 10−4 for the cross-talk. By using the ap-
proach introduced in [6] the min-entropy Hmin(X|C) can
be evaluated by the following relation:
2−Hmin(X|C) =
∞∑
n=0
∑
{si}
PN (n)PS(s)2−Hmin(X|n,s) (3)
where
2−Hmin(X|n,s) = max
x
P(x|n, s) , (4)
and P(x|n, s) is the probability of obtaining the
random string x conditioned on the chosen pixel
configuration vector s and the emitted number of
4FIG. 3. Equivalent optical model of our QRNG, based on a photonic quantum state characterized by an uniform coherent
spatial modal structure detected by a matrix of pixels. The equivalent model is the 50:50 beam splitter “multinomial tree”,
whose scheme is reported in Figure.
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FIG. 4. Values of η˜i in function of µ as derived by Eq. (2).
The dots represent the experimental data, while the curve is
the fit.
photons n. In the above equation the sum
∑
{si} runs
over all the 2M possible status configurations. We
note that, if Eve has no information on the emitted
number of photons, the min-entropy should be eval-
uated as 2−Hmin(X|C) =
∑
{si} PS(s)2−Hmin(X|s) with
2−Hmin(X|s) = maxx[
∑∞
n=0 P(x|n, s)PN (n)].
Eq. (3) generalizes the relation introduced in [6] from
two detectors to M detectors. From Eq. (3), the con-
ditional entropy Hmin(X|C) depends on the largest con-
ditional probability P(x|n, s). In fact, according to our
model, knowing the number of photons emitted by the
source and the sensor configuration, the best guessing
strategy for Eve is to bet on the string x with the largest
probability of appearance. As described in Eq. (3), in or-
der to obtain a lower bound on the conditional quantum
min-entropy, such maximal probability maxx P(x|n, s)
must be “weighted” with the probability of having a given
{n, s}. In the next section we will present our main result,
which is an efficient method to evaluate the conditional
probabilities P(x|n, s) (see in particular Eq. (8)).
III. RESULTS
In order to calculate P(x|n, s), we need to evaluate
the evolution of n-photon Fock states and how such pho-
tons arrive at the different detectors. If the spatial wave-
function of each photon is pure, the equivalent quantum
optical model of our setup corresponds to the so-called
“multinomial tree” of 2L − 1 beam splitters (with 50:50
reflection:transmission ratio) followed by M = 2L detec-
tors, as schematically reported in Fig. 3 for L = 41.
Indeed, in the approximation of an uniform and coherent
spatial structure of the light with respect to the sensor, a
single photon emitted by the laser has the same probabil-
ity of arriving at each pixel detector. The requirement of
the purity of the spatial wavefunction is essential for the
assessment of the quantum randomness: only in this case
the detection of the photon in a given location is truly
random and cannot (even in principle) be predicted. On
the other hand, if the spatial wavefunction is incoherent
(such as it happens with a LED emission), the informa-
tion on the photon location is correlated with the envi-
ronment and could, at least in principle, be predicted.
For this reason it is crucial that the light exits from a
single mode fiber (the mode propagating into the single-
mode fiber is pure). In line with [6], in the multinomial
tree, the n photons at the input evolves coherently to-
wards the output and nothing than vacuum states enters
at the other inputs of the tree.
If n photons are emitted by the source within the in-
tegration time T , the quantum state |Ψ〉n before the de-
tectors can be written as
|Ψ〉n = 1√
n!
( 1√
M
M∑
i=1
aˆ†i
)n|0〉 (5)
=
∑
{ni}
√
n!√
Mnn1! · · ·nM !
δn1+...+nM ,n|n〉 , (6)
where |0〉 is the joint vacuum of all modes, aˆ†i are the
output modes creation operators and |n〉 ≡ |n1, · · · , nM 〉
1 If M is not a power of 2, a multinomial tree can be also ob-
tained. In this case the beam splitters are no more 50:50, but
their transmissivity is set such that a single photon entering in
the tree has the same probability of arriving at each detector.
5xi si requirement on ni
0 0 no requirement
0 1 ni = 0
1 0 no arrangement is compatible
1 1 ni ≥ 1
TABLE I. The Table reports the requirement for each pixel
detector i for a compatible arrangement n given that the out-
put x is obtained and the detector configuration s is chosen.
is the normalized state with ni photons arriving at detec-
tor Di. We note that the Kronecker delta implements the
condition n =
∑
k nk. In our model, the M output mode
entangled state |Ψ〉n is the equivalent of bi-mode entan-
gled output state at the polarizing beam-splitter in [6].
In addition, because the tree has not common knots, in-
terference effects are excluded; therefore the probability
that all n photons arrive at pixel Di is given by 1/M
n.
Because, as presented in [6], the detection opera-
tors applied on |Ψ〉n are all diagonal in the Fock basis,
the estimation of the probabilities P(x|n, s) can be ap-
proached classically by means of the multinomial distri-
bution. From Eq. (5), the probability that n photons
arrive at the different detectors with a given arrange-
ment n = {n1, n2, · · · , nM} is indeed given by the multi-
nomial distribution. Then, for a given set of classical
variables {n, s}, P(x|n, s) can be computed by the sum
of the probabilities of obtaining the arrangements n that
are compatible with the output x and the given detector
configuration s. The term compatible means the follow-
ing: if xi = 1, the compatible arrangements are only those
with ni > 0 and si = 1 (a detection at location i requires
an active detector and at least one photon arriving at it).
If xi = 0, only the arrangements with si = 1 and ni = 0
or those with si = 0 are compatible (a non-detection
may correspond to an active detector with no photon
impinging on it or to an inactive detector). If xi = 1 and
si = 0 there are no compatible arrangements (when the
detector i is inactive it cannot detect any photons). The
conditions for a compatible arrangement are summarized
in Table I. Furthermore, the equation k ≡ ∑i xi ≤ n
must be satisfied: it corresponds to the condition that
the numbers of detections cannot be greater than the
number of incoming photons. Then, when k ≤ n the
probability P(x|n, s) can be written as
P(x|n, s) =
∑
n compat.
with (x,s)
n!
Mnn1! · · ·nM !δn1+...+nM ,n (7)
= δ|I10|,0
n!
Mn
∏
i∈I00
(
n∑
ni=0
1
ni!
)
∏
j∈I11
(
n∑
nj=1
1
nj !
)δn1+...+nM ,n
where Iab is the set of indices defined by Iab = {i | xi =
a ∧ si = b} and |Iab| is its cardinality. The last relation
in (7) is obtained by explicitly considering the arrange-
ments n that are compatible (x, s) as reported in table
I. An example of the probabilities evaluated for a matrix
with M = 9 and n = 9 photons is reported in the “matrix
plot” of Fig. 5 (Left), with different colors related to the
values of the probabilities. Rows and columns account
for all the possible 29 configurations of s and x respec-
tively. The fractal structure that is obtained resembles
the Sierpinsky triangle [14], where the white areas cor-
respond to combinations of (x, s) for which no photon
arrangement is compatible.
The finding of the largest probability can be simpli-
fied by exploiting the symmetries of P(x|n, s). Indeed,
for the values of x and s admitting compatible arrange-
ments (namely those values for which |I10| = 0) the prob-
ability P(x|n, s) is uniquely determined by the Hamming
weights of x and s, defined as k =
∑
i xi and ` =
∑
si
and it is not vanishing only for k ≤ `. We note that k
and ` correspond to the numbers of detections and ac-
tive pixels respectively. We also define r as the number
of inactive pixels, namely r = M−`. Since k and ` range
from 0 to M , inequivalent values of P(x|n, s), denoted by
P(k|n, `), can be listed in a reduced M + 1×M + 1 ma-
trix, simplifying the maximization in (4) from a set with
at most 2M elements to a set with at most cardinality
M + 1.
However, the computation of the conditional probabil-
ities remains hard due to the k+ r sums contained in the
r.h.s. of Eq. (7). We note that k + r may be as large as
M , implying an increasing complexity with the number
of detectors. As we will demonstrate soon, the evaluation
of P(x|n, s) can be simplified by the following relation:
P(x|n, s) =
 δ|I10|,0
k!
Mn
{
n+ r
k + r
}
r
, if k ≤ n
0 if k > n
(8)
where {
n+ r
k + r
}
r
=
k∑
j=0
(−1)k−j
j!(k − j)! (r + j)
n . (9)
The symbol
{
n
k
}
r
represents the r-restricted Stirling num-
ber of the second kind, defined as the number of par-
titions of the set {1, · · · , n} into k non-empty disjoint
subsets, such that the numbers {1, · · · , r} are in distinct
subsets [15]. As demonstrated in appendix the r-Stirling
numbers can be explicitly evaluated as the r.h.s. of Eq.
(9). We recall that in the equation (8) we have defined
k =
∑
i xi and r = M −
∑
i si. With the introduction
of the Stirling numbers we therefore achieved a dramatic
reduction of the time necessary to compute P(x|n, s).
Indeed, the evaluation of
{
n+r
k+r
}
r
in Eq. (8) has just a
single sum, that must be compared with the k + r sums
required to evaluate Eq. (7). The rest of the section will
be devoted to demonstrate Eq. (8).
We first note that, when |I01| = 0 and k ≤ n, the num-
ber tk,r(n) ≡ P(k|n, `) ·Mn corresponds to the number
of ways of distributing n photons on |I00|+ |I11| = r+ k
6FIG. 5. Left: In a 512 × 512 matrix, we show the conditional probabilities P(x|n, s) for all the possible x (columns) and
pixel status configurations s (rows), for a sensor matrix with M = 9 and with n = 9. The matrix resembles the multinomial
Sierpinsky triangle. A zoom of the fractal structure is reported into the inset. Right: Inequivalent values of P(x|n, s) are
shown in function of k and `.
pixels such that k of them (the active pixels that have
sj = 1) receive at least one photon. Indeed, as indicated
by Eq. (7) we must consider the events in which the
photons arrive only at pixel Di and Dj with i ∈ I00 and
j ∈ I11, with the extra requirements that at least one
photon arrive at each active pixel Dj . To evaluate the
number tk,r(n) we may proceed as follow. Let’s consider
a set with n “real” photons and r “fictitious” photons.
By definition, the number of partitions of the n+ r pho-
tons into k+ r non-empty disjoint subsets, such that the
r fictitious photons are always in distinct subsets is given
by the r-Stirling numbers
{
n+r
k+r
}
r
. We note that, due to
the presence of “fictitious” photons, k subsets have at
least one “real” photon, while the remaining r subsets
may have any number of “real” photons. Now we can
associate a pixel to each of the k + r subsets: in this
way, k pixels receive at least one photon, as required in
the definition of tk,r(n). However, the number
{
n+r
k+r
}
r
underestimates tk,r(n): indeed, different associations of
the k subsets containing no fictitious photons with the
k active pixels will give rise to different photon distribu-
tions. On the other hand, the r subsets with one fictious
photon can be uniquely associated to the r inactive pix-
els. Then, tk,r(n) is obtained by multiplying
{
n+r
k+r
}
r
by
the permutation of k pixels, namely tk,r(n) = k!
{
n+r
k+r
}
r
.
Since P (k|n, `) = tk,r(n)/Mn, we have demonstrated Eq.
(8).
To better illustrated the procedure, we show in
Table II the case of M = 6 pixels, n = 4 photons,
x = {1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0} and s = {1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0}. In this case,
r = 2 and k = 3. Since x4 = 0 and s4 = 1, no photon
must impinge on D4. To evaluate tk,r(n), we must count
all the distributions of 4 photons on 5 detectors, such
that three of them (D1, D2 and D3) receive at least one
photon. Since r = 2, two fictitious photons, labelled α
and β, are added to the set of the real photons. In Table
II we list all the partitions of the set {1, 2, 3, 4, α, β} in 5
subsets, such that the fictitious photons are in distinct
subsets. The number of partitions is indeed counted
1 {2}, {3}, {4}, {α,1}, {β}
2 {2}, {3}, {4}, {α}, {β,1}
3 {1}, {3}, {4}, {α,2}, {β}
4 {1}, {3}, {4}, {α}, {β,2}
5 {1}, {2}, {4}, {α,3}, {β}
6 {1}, {2}, {4}, {α}, {β,3}
7 {1}, {2}, {3}, {α,4}, {β}
8 {1}, {2}, {3}, {α}, {β,4}
9 {1,4}, {2}, {3}, {α}, {β}
10 {1}, {2,4}, {3}, {α}, {β}
11 {1}, {2}, {3,4} , {α}, {β}
12 {1,2}, {3}, {4}, {α}, {β}
13 {1}, {2,3}, {4}, {α}, {β}
14 {2}, {3,1}, {4}, {α}, {β}
TABLE II. In the Table, we cosider the case of M = 6
pixels, n = {1, 2, 3, 4} photons, x = {1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0} and
s = {1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0}. We list all the possible partitions of the
set {1, 2, 3, 4, α, β} in 5 subsets, such that the fictitious pho-
tons are in distinct subsets.
by
{
6
5
}
2
= 14. The sets with α and β can be uniquely
associated with the inactive pixels D5 and D6. Indeed,
the Table accounts for all the inequivalent “real” photon
arrangements on the inactive pixels. However, the Table
does not take into account inequivalent “real” photon
arrangements on the active pixels: for instance, in
partition 1 we have the three possible associations with
the detectors: {{2} → D1, {3} → D2, {4} → D3},
{{2} → D3, {3} → D1, {4} → D2} and
{{2} → D2, {3} → D3, {4} → D1}; the same hap-
pens for the other listed partitions. Then, the number of
permutations of the k active pixel should be considered,
in order to obtain tk,r(n) = k!
{
n+r
k+r
}
r
= 84.
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FIG. 6. The classical min-entropy, H∞(X) (red line), with
the experimental points and the conditional one, Hmin(X|C)
(blue line), are plotted as function of µ, the average number
of photons emitted by the source per integration time and per
pixel. The plot considers the sub-matrix of 3×3 pixels of Fig.
1.
IV. DISCUSSION
By using the results presented in the previous section
we are now ready to evaluate the quantum randomness
of the generator. By further assuming that the detec-
tors have all the same efficiency (such that η˜i ≡ η˜), the
conditional min-entropy simplifies to
Hmin(X|N,S) = − log2
[ ∞∑
n=0
PN (n)
M∑
r=0
(
M
r
)
×
η˜M−r(1− η˜)r max
k
k!
Mn
{
n+ r
k + r
}
r
]
,
(10)
that evaluates the amount of bits which can be considered
random and secure after the application of a quantum
randomness extractor.
In Fig. 6 we compare the classical min-entropy H∞(X)
(red solid line) and Hmin(X|C) (blue solid line) as func-
tion of the parameter µ, for the 3 × 3 pixel sub-matrix
considered in Fig. 1. As shown in Fig.6, when the eaves-
dropper has information on the emitted photon number
and can gate the detectors, the classical min-entropy is
not suitable to estimate the real content of randomness
as it yields a too optimistic estimation. In particular we
observe that by using H∞(X), the user might be induced
to increase the value of µ to maximize the entropy. In
reality, by doing so, the user gives to Eve a dramatic
guessing advantage as only ≈ 6 · 10−12 bits out of 9 can
be considered secure for µ ≈ µopt. In fact, when the
mean number of photons per pixel is high, although the
input state is pure, all the active pixels will output a bit
xi = 1 with high probability, while all the inactive pixels
will output a bit xi = 0 with certainty: by knowing the
detector status s, Eve may guess with high probability
the output string x.
As it can be derived from the plot, the best strategy
to obtain a high secure rate it is to keep low the aver-
age number of photon per pixel: in this way, although
Eve already knows that the inactive pixels will output
xi = 0, thanks to the purity of the state, she cannot
predict the outcomes of the active pixels. In this condi-
FIG. 7. Classical and quantum min-entropy evaluated on the
four 16× 16 pixels sub-matrices of the Camera.
tion, we applied the efficient relation of Eq. (10) on a
large number of detectors and we estimated the entropy
of the four 16 × 16 pixels sub-matrices as if they were
illuminated by an uniform intensity (an improved code
for evaluating Eq. (10) is required for a larger number
of pixels). The comparison of the classical and quantum
min-entropies is presented in Fig. 7. We conservatively
assumed that the whole sensor was illuminated with the
largest value of µ registered: in this way it is possible
to increase the relative secure rate. By this approach we
were able to generate secure random numbers at a rate
of R ' 1.547 Mbit/s. We note that such rate can be
improved by using a laser light at a different wavelength,
where the detection efficiency is higher. Indeed, when
the measured detection efficiency is high, Eve must keep
the detector active with high probability, giving her less
chance to guess the output string x.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We here presented a protocol which enable the user of
a multi-detector QRNG to extract secure random bits for
cryptographic applications. In our framework an eaves-
dropper may have access to the “classical information”
of the QRNG, that can be used to enhance his chances to
guess the generator outcomes. Such “classical informa-
tion” is represented by the number of photons emitted
by the source and the detector status. Indeed, in our
model, the measured detector inefficiencies are modeled
by perfect detectors that are randomly activated by the
adversary. As we demonstrated, an efficient combina-
torial method can be used to calculate the conditional
min-entropy. Once the quantum min-entropy is known,
the generated sequence must be post-processed by a ran-
domness extractor that will generate bits with the rate
imposed by H(X|C). In this “paranoid scenario”, we
were able to generate secure random numbers at a rate
of R ' 1.547 Mbit/s. It is worth noticing that, if the
information available to Eve is reduced (for instance by
assuming that she does not known the number of photons
emitted by the source or by assuming that she cannot
control the detector gating), the secure key rate will be
8increased.
By comparing the conditional min-entropy H(X|C)
and the commonly used classical min-entropy H∞(X),
we have shown how the use of the latter, while it may
increase the generation rate up to Rgen = 50.176Mbit/s,
it might endanger the QRNG security.
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Appendix A: Evaluation of the r-restricted Stirling
numbers
As reported in Eq. (31) of [15], the r-restricted Stirling
numbers of the second kind satisfy the following relation{
n
k
}
r
=
n−r∑
i=0
(
n− r
i
){
n− p− i
k − p
}
r−p
pi , (A1)
for any integer p such that 0 ≤ p ≤ r. By replacing
n→ n+r, k → k+r and using p = r we obtain {n+rk+r}r =∑n
i=0
(
n
i
){
n−i
k
}
ri. Now, we may exploit the property that
the Stirling numbers
{
n
k
}
can be evaluated by the explicit
formula [16] {
n
k
}
=
1
k!
k∑
j=0
(−1)k−j
(
k
j
)
jn . (A2)
Then (A1) may be written as{
n+ r
k + r
}
r
=
1
k!
k∑
j=0
(−1)k−j
(
k
j
) n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
jn−iri
=
1
k!
k∑
j=0
(−1)k−j
(
k
j
)
(j + r)n
(A3)
We have thus demonstrated Eq. (9) of the main text.
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